Why Raising Salaries Alone Cannot Cure Sri Lanka’s Corruption and What the Singapore Experience Truly Teaches

The notion that merely increasing public sector salaries will stem the tide of corruption is a persistent and seductive argument in the policy circles of many developing nations, including Sri Lanka. It presents a seemingly straightforward economic transaction: pay public servants well, and the incentive for bribery and corruption will diminish, leading to efficient service. While this argument contains a kernel of truth, it represents a dangerous oversimplification of a deeply complex governance challenge. From my experience in government policy positions and working with UN agencies on development economics, I have observed that treating salary hikes as a panacea is a costly policy misstep. The more rigorous and evidence-based conclusion is that competitive remuneration is a necessary, but woefully insufficient, condition for fostering a clean, efficient bureaucracy. Without a concurrent, and indeed prior, investment in a robust ecosystem of accountability, transparency, and enforcement, higher salaries simply create a better-paid, yet potentially still corrupt, civil service. This analysis will critically deconstruct the limited logic of the salary-centric approach within the Sri Lankan context. It will then argue, by drawing on the foundational lessons of Singapore's success, that it is the overarching, mutually reinforcing system of governance—where salary is just one integrated component—that creates an environment where corruption becomes an irrational, high-risk act, rather than a low-risk, high-reward necessity.

To first acknowledge the valid premise, there is an empirical basis for linking abysmally low public sector pay to a higher propensity for petty corruption. When a government clerk, a police constable, or a local-level official cannot support their family on their official earnings, the moral calculus of accepting a bribe is profoundly altered. It becomes rationalised as a survival mechanism, a "top-up" to an inadequate income. International bodies like the World Bank have long recognised this "efficiency wage" theory. However, the critical failure in policy arises when this single variable is isolated and elevated as the primary solution. In a system like Sri Lanka's, which is characterised by significant political interference, institutionalised impunity, and complex bureaucratic red tape, a blanket salary increase is analogous to installing a luxury tap on a pipe connected to a contaminated water source. The fixture is improved, but the output remains polluted. We have seen instances in various countries where public sector wages were raised without systemic reforms, only for corruption to persist, albeit sometimes at a higher, more sophisticated level. The problem morphs from "survival corruption" to "greed corruption," without a net improvement in service efficiency or institutional integrity.

The specific admonition against political appointments is astute and strikes at the heart of the problem in Sri Lanka. The practice of filling key bureaucratic positions based on political loyalty rather than meritocratic competence is a cancer on governance. It creates a civil service accountable not to the public or the rule of law, but to a political patron. This fundamentally undermines the very concept of a neutral, professional administration. An officer appointed through political connection has their allegiance secured, and their primary objective becomes maintaining the political fortunes of their patron, not delivering services efficiently or upholding integrity. In such an environment, even a tripling of their salary will not reorient their priorities towards public service; it merely increases the cost of their loyalty. Therefore, any discussion on salary reform is moot without first insulating the civil service from politicisation.

It is here that the Singapore experience provides its most powerful, and often misunderstood, lessons. The common narrative reduces Singapore's success to its high public sector pay. The reality is that the "clean salary" policy was a consequence of a prior, and far more critical, systemic overhaul, not the initial cause of its cleanliness. When Singapore embarked on its transformation in the 1960s, its first and most decisive actions were systemic and institutional. The cornerstone was the empowerment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). The CPIB was not just created; it was endowed with formidable operational independence, reporting directly to the Prime Minister's Office, with its own budget and powers to investigate anyone, including ministers and senior colleagues, without requiring prior permission. This independence is the bedrock upon which everything else was built.

This powerful enforcement capability was then backed by a legal framework designed for maximum deterrence. The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) is notoriously comprehensive and strict. Crucially, it contains a provision for the "presumption of guilt" in cases of unexplained wealth. Section 8 of the PCA states that any gratification received by a public servant is deemed to have been received corruptly unless the accused can prove otherwise. This legally reverses the burden of proof, placing an immense onus on the official to account for their assets. The penalties, including heavy fines and imprisonment, are severe. This combination of a highly probable risk of detection by an independent agency and a severe legal consequence upon conviction creates a powerful disincentive structure.

It was only after this robust system of deterrence was firmly established that Singapore turned to the question of competitive remuneration in the 1990s with its "clean salary" policy. The philosophy, as articulated by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, was strategic: to pay public servants a salary competitive with the private sector to "recruit and retain talent" and to ensure that the opportunity cost of losing one's career, prestige, and income through a corrupt act was catastrophically high (Lee, 2000). A minister's salary, for instance, is pegged to a significant percentage of the median income of top private sector earners. The high salary, therefore, functions effectively precisely because the system has already made corruption a high-risk activity. The salary is the reward for integrity within a system that guarantees punishment for its breach. The following chart conceptualises this interlocking system:

The Interlocking Anti-Corruption System of Singapore

+-----------------------+    +-----------------------+    +-----------------------+

| Stringent Legal       |    | Independent &         |    | Competitive,         |

| Framework (PCA)       |--->| Powerful CPIB         |--->| "Clean" Salary       |

| (Presumption of Guilt)|    | (High Detection Risk) |    | (High Opportunity Cost)|

+-----------------------+    +-----------------------+    +-----------------------+

          ^                                                          |

          |                                                          |

          +----------------------------------------------------------+

                                  |

                      Creates a Culture of Zero Tolerance & Integrity

The data unequivocally supports the success of this systemic approach. Singapore has consistently ranked among the top five least corrupt nations in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for decades. In the 2023 index, it ranked 5th with a score of 83 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2024). Contrast this with Sri Lanka's trajectory. Despite periodic salary revisions for public servants, Sri Lanka's performance has been stagnant or declining. In the 2023 CPI, Sri Lanka ranked 115th with a score of 34, a clear indicator that salary increases alone have failed to make a dent in perceived corruption levels (Transparency International, 2024). The gap is not one of salary, but of system.

Figure 1: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Score Trajectory: Singapore vs. Sri Lanka (2015-2023)

Year	Singapore CPI Score	Sri Lanka CPI Score
2015	85	37
2016	84	36
2017	84	38
2016	84	38
2019	85	38
2020	85	38
2021	85	37
2022	83	36
2023	83	34

*Source: Adapted from Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2015-2023)*

This chart visually encapsulates the failure of isolated interventions. While Singapore maintains a stellar and stable score, Sri Lanka's shows a concerning decline, particularly in recent years of economic crisis, proving that systemic fragility ultimately trumps any short-term financial incentives.

Furthermore, Singapore complemented its legal and salary measures with a relentless drive for systemic simplification and digitalisation. By reducing human discretion through e-governance—making processes for licenses, permits, and tax filings online, transparent, and rule-based—it engineered out the very opportunities for "speed money" or facilitation payments. This is a crucial lesson for Sri Lanka, where cumbersome, opaque procedures are a breeding ground for petty corruption.

Therefore, for Sri Lanka, the path forward requires a holistic, sequenced, and politically courageous strategy that looks beyond the treasury's balance sheet.

First, depoliticise the core civil service. This is the non-negotiable first step. Legislation must be strengthened to ensure that appointments to key administrative positions (like Secretaries of Ministries) are based on merit, seniority, and competence, insulated from political changes. An independent constitutional council must have real teeth in approving appointments.

Second, empower an independent anti-corruption agency. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) must be transformed. This requires legislative amendment to grant it operational and financial autonomy akin to the CPIB, with its own investigating officers with police powers, and security of tenure for its leadership. It must be able to initiate investigations against any public official, including the highest offices, without requiring political consent.

Third, enact judicial and legal reforms. This includes amending the Bribery Act to incorporate a "Unexplained Wealth" provision, shifting the burden of proof to the accused. Simultaneously, the judiciary must be fortified. A corrupt or politicised judiciary is the single point of failure for any anti-corruption drive. Ensuring judicial independence through transparent appointments and adequate resources is paramount.

Fourth, launch a war on red tape through digitalisation. A national priority should be to identify the top 50 citizen-facing government services and completely digitise them, making the process automated, transparent, and trackable. This removes the intermediary official and the opportunity for solicitation.

Finally, and only after credible, demonstrable progress on these systemic pillars, should a comprehensive public sector compensation review be undertaken. This review should not be a blanket hike. It must be part of a performance-linked reform, rationalising grades and ensuring that pay is competitive for the talent the country wishes to attract and retain, but within a system where integrity is the non-negotiable price of employment.

In conclusion, the proposition that Sri Lanka can simply pay its way out of systemic corruption is an illusion, a policy mirage that has wasted precious fiscal resources without yielding the desired governance dividends. The Singapore experience, when studied in its entirety, teaches a far more profound and challenging lesson. It demonstrates that corruption is defeated not by a single policy lever but by the conscious construction of an interlocking, self-reinforcing ecosystem where the probability of detection is high, the legal and professional consequences are severe and swift, and the opportunity cost of corruption is made unacceptably high through a combination of competitive remuneration, professional prestige, and societal respect. For Sri Lanka, the choice is not between raising salaries and building systems. The choice is to recognise that without first building the system, any investment in higher salaries will yield a disappointingly low return in integrity and efficiency. The journey is long and requires unwavering political will, but it is the only one that leads to a truly clean and prosperous future.

References

Lee, K. Y. (2000). *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*. HarperCollins.

Transparency International (2024). Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023 (Accessed: 15 June 2024).