The notion that merely
increasing public sector salaries will stem the tide of corruption is a
persistent and seductive argument in the policy circles of many developing
nations, including Sri Lanka. It presents a seemingly straightforward economic
transaction: pay public servants well, and the incentive for bribery and
corruption will diminish, leading to efficient service. While this argument
contains a kernel of truth, it represents a dangerous oversimplification of a
deeply complex governance challenge. From my experience in government policy
positions and working with UN agencies on development economics, I have
observed that treating salary hikes as a panacea is a costly policy misstep.
The more rigorous and evidence-based conclusion is that competitive
remuneration is a necessary, but woefully insufficient, condition for fostering
a clean, efficient bureaucracy. Without a concurrent, and indeed prior,
investment in a robust ecosystem of accountability, transparency, and
enforcement, higher salaries simply create a better-paid, yet potentially still
corrupt, civil service. This analysis will critically deconstruct the limited
logic of the salary-centric approach within the Sri Lankan context. It will
then argue, by drawing on the foundational lessons of Singapore's success, that
it is the overarching, mutually reinforcing system of
governance—where salary is just one integrated component—that creates an
environment where corruption becomes an irrational, high-risk act, rather than
a low-risk, high-reward necessity.
